Air raids on Japan

Air raids on Japan Part of Pacific War, World War II B-29 Superfortress bombers dropping incendiary bombs on Yokohama during May 1945[1] Date 18 April 1942 – 15 August 1945 Location Japanese home islands Result Allied victory Belligerents United States United Kingdom Empire of Japan Casualties and losses 20th Air Force: 414 B-29 bombers Over 2,600 killed[2] Estimates vary between 300,000 and 900,000 killed

Japan campaign Air raids Mariana Islands Volcano & Ryukyu Is Tokyo Starvation Naval bombardments Yokosuka Sagami Bay Kure Downfall Hiroshima & Nagasaki Kurils Japanese surrender

During World War II, Allied forces conducted many air raids on Japan which caused extensive destruction to the country's cities and killed over 300,000 people. During the first years of the Pacific War, these attacks were limited to the Doolittle Raid in April 1942 and small-scale raids on military positions in the Kuril Islands from mid-1943. Strategic bombing raids on Japan began in June 1944 and continued until the end of the war in August 1945. Allied naval and land-based tactical air units also raided Japan during 1945.

While the United States military had developed plans for an air campaign against Japan prior to the Pacific War, the capture of Allied bases in the western Pacific in the first weeks of the conflict meant that this offensive did not begin until mid-1944 when the long-ranged B-29 Superfortress was ready for use in combat. India-based B-29s staging through bases in China made a series of raids on strategic targets in Japan between June 1944 and January 1945, but this effort proved unsuccessful. The strategic bombing campaign against Japan was greatly expanded from November 1944 when bases in the Mariana Islands became available as a result of the Mariana Islands Campaign. These attacks initially targeted key industrial facilities, but from March 1945 were frequently directed against urban areas. Aircraft flying from Allied aircraft carriers and the Ryukyu Islands also regularly struck targets in Japan during 1945; most of these raids were made in preparation for the planned Allied invasion which was scheduled for October 1945. The capture of Okinawa in June 1945 provided airfields even closer to the Japanese mainland, allowing the bombing campaign to be escalated further. The Japanese military was unable to stop the Allied attacks, and the country's civil defense preparations proved inadequate. During early August 1945, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked with atomic bombs. Along with the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, the Allied bombing campaign was one of the main factors which influenced the Japanese Government's decision to surrender in mid-August 1945.

Estimates of the number of Japanese killed during the air attacks range from 300,000 to 900,000. In addition to the loss of life, the raids caused extensive damage to Japan's cities and contributed to a large decline in industrial production. There has been long-running debate over the morality of the attacks on Japan, with the use of atomic weapons being particularly controversial.

Contents 1 Background 1.1 United States plans 1.2 Pre-war Japanese defenses 2 Early raids 2.1 Doolittle Raid 2.2 Bombing of the Kuril Islands 3 Operation Matterhorn 3.1 Preparations 3.2 Attacks from China 4 Initial attacks from the Mariana Islands 5 Firebombing attacks 5.1 LeMay changes tactics 5.2 March firebombing campaign 5.3 Destruction of Japan's main cities 6 Attacks on small cities 7 Aerial mine laying 8 Naval air attacks 9 Raids from Iwo Jima and Okinawa 10 Japanese military response 10.1 Air defenses 10.2 Treatment of prisoners of war 11 Atomic bombings and final attacks 12 Postwar 13 Assessments 13.1 Results 13.2 Morality 14 Notes 15 References 16 Further reading 17 External links

Background

United States plans

The United States Army Air Corps (which was subsumed by the United States Army Air Forces, or USAAF, in February 1942)^[3] began contingency planning for an air campaign against Japan during 1940. During that year the naval attaché to the Embassy of the United States in Tokyo reported on Japan's weak civil defenses, and proposals were developed for US volunteer aircrew to assist the Chinese forces in the Second Sino-Japanese War.^[4] The first American Volunteer Group (the "Flying Tigers") began operations as part of the Chinese Air Force in late 1941 using fighter aircraft. A second American Volunteer Group was subsequently formed to attack Japan from bases in China using Hudson and A-20 Havoc medium bombers, but was diverted elsewhere in Asia following the Attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 which led to open hostilities between the US and Japan.^[5]

Japanese successes during the opening months of the Pacific War nullified pre-war US plans for attacks against the Japanese homeland. Before the outbreak of war, the USAAF had planned to bomb Japan from Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines and coastal areas in China.^[5] These areas were rapidly captured by Japanese forces, however, and the USAAF heavy bomber force in the Philippines was largely destroyed when Clark Air Base was attacked on 8 December 1941.^[6] The USAAF attempted to send 13 heavy bombers to China in March and April 1942 to attack the Japanese home islands. These aircraft reached India, but remained there when the Japanese conquest of Burma caused logistics problems and Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek proved reluctant to allow the aircraft to operate from territory under his control. A further 13 B-24 Liberator heavy bombers were dispatched from the United States to China in May 1942 as the HALPRO force, but were re-tasked to support Allied operations in the Mediterranean when they reached Egypt.^[7] In July 1942 the commander of the American Volunteer Group, Colonel Claire Lee Chennault, sought a force of 100 P-47 Thunderbolt fighters and 30 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers which he believed would be sufficient to "destroy" the Japanese aircraft industry. Three months later Chennault told President Franklin D. Roosevelt that a force of 105 modern fighters and 40 bombers (including 12 heavy bombers) would be able to "accomplish the downfall of Japan" within six to twelve months. These claims were not considered credible by the USAAF's headquarters, and Chennault's requests for reinforcements were not granted.^[7]

Pre-war Japanese defenses

Japan's pre-war plans to protect the country from air attack were based around neutralizing potential enemy air bases. Before the war, it was believed that the aircraft of the Soviet Union based in the country's far east posed the greatest threat. The Japanese military's plans for dealing with this threat called for the destruction of Soviet air bases within reach of the home islands at the outset of war.^[8] When the Pacific War began, the Japanese Government believed that the best way to prevent American air raids was to capture and hold the areas in China and the Pacific from which attacks could be launched. It was anticipated that the Allies might attack the home islands using naval aircraft flying from aircraft carriers, but any such raids were expected to be conducted on a small scale and made mainly to boost morale in the United States and Britain. The Japanese Government chose to not develop strong air defenses as the country's industrial resources were insufficient to maintain an offensive air force in China and the Pacific as well as a defensive air force in the home islands. It was also expected that the Allies would not be able to re-capture air bases within range of Japan.^[9]

As a result of Japan's offensive doctrine and limited resources, the country's air defenses were weak at the start of the Pacific War. In early 1942 forces allocated to the defense of Japan comprised 100 Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) and 200 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) fighter aircraft (many of which were obsolete) as well as 500 Army-manned and 200 IJN-manned anti-aircraft guns.^[10] Most of the IJAAF and IJN formations stationed in the home islands were training units which had only a limited ability to counter Allied attacks.^[11] The Army also operated a network of military and civilian-manned observation posts to provide warning of air attack and was in the process of building radar stations. Command and control of the air defenses was fragmented, and the IJAAF and IJN did not coordinate their activities or communicate with each other. As a result, the forces were unable to react to a sudden air attack.^[10]

Japan's civil defense organization was not prepared for large-scale air attacks. Air raid drills had been held in Tokyo and Osaka since 1928, and from 1937 local governments were required to provide civilians with manuals which explained how to respond to air attacks.^[12] Few cities had full-time professional firefighters, however, and most relied on volunteers. Such firefighting forces that did exist lacked modern equipment and used outdated tactics.^[13] In addition, few measures were undertaken to provide air defense facilities for civilians or industry such as the construction of air-raid shelters.^[14]

Early raids

Doolittle Raid

USAAF aircraft bombed Japan for the first time in mid-April 1942. In an operation conducted primarily to raise morale in the United States, 16 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers were embarked aboard the aircraft carrier USS Hornet which carried them from San Francisco to within range of Japan. The aircraft were launched on 18 April, and individually bombed targets in Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokosuka, Nagoya and Kobe. The few Japanese air defense units were taken by surprise, and all the B-25s escaped without serious damage. The aircraft then continued to China and the Soviet Union, though several crashed in Japanese-held territory after running out of fuel.^[15] Japanese casualties were 50 killed and over 400 wounded. About 200 houses were also destroyed.^[16]

Although the Doolittle Raid caused little damage, it had important ramifications. The attack raised morale in the United States and made a hero out of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle.^[17] The weak state of Japan's air defenses greatly embarrassed the Japanese military leadership, and four fighter groups were transferred from the Pacific to defend the home islands. In an attempt to prevent further attacks, the IJN also launched an offensive in the Pacific Ocean which ended in defeat during the Battle of Midway.^[18] The Japanese Army also conducted the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign to capture the air bases in central China at which the Doolittle Raiders had intended to land. This offensive achieved its objectives and resulted in the deaths of 250,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians, including many civilians killed in war crimes.^[19] In an attempt to retaliate against the Doolittle Raid, the IJA also began developing fire balloons capable of carrying incendiary and anti-personnel bombs from Japan to the continental United States.^[20]

Bombing of the Kuril Islands

Following the Doolittle Raid, the next air attacks on Japan were made against the Kuril Islands in mid-1943. The liberation of Attu Island in May 1943 during the Aleutian Islands Campaign provided the USAAF with bases within range of the Kurils. As part of the preparations for the liberation of Kiska Island the Eleventh Air Force planned a series of raids against the Kurils to suppress Japanese air units stationed there. The first of these attacks was made against southern Shumshu and northern Paramushiru by eight B-25s on 10 July. The Kurils were attacked again on 18 July by six B-24 Liberator heavy bombers, and the unopposed liberation of Kiska (Operation Cottage) took place on 15 August.^[21]

The Eleventh Air Force and U.S. Navy units continued to make small-scale raids on the Kuril Islands until the closing months of the war. The USAAF attacks were broken off for five months following a raid on 11 September when nine of the 20 B-24s and B-25s dispatched were lost, but U.S. Navy PBY Catalinas continued to bomb Japanese positions in the Kurils. In response to the American attacks, the IJN established the North-East Area Fleet in August 1943, and in November that year Japanese fighter strength in the Kurils and Hokkaidō peaked at 260 aircraft. The Eleventh Air Force resumed its offensive in February 1944 after it had been reinforced with two squadrons of P-38 Lightning escort fighters, and continued to attack targets in the Kurils until June 1945.^[22] While these raids caused little damage, they forced the Japanese to divert large numbers of soldiers to defend their northern islands against a potential United States invasion.^[23]

Operation Matterhorn

Preparations

In late 1943, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a proposal to begin the strategic air campaign against the Japanese home islands and East Asia by basing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers in India and establishing forward airfields in China. This strategy, which was designated Operation Matterhorn, involved the construction of large airstrips near Chengtu in inland China which would be used to refuel B-29s traveling from bases in Bengal en-route to targets in Japan.^[24] While Chennault, who was by now the commander of the Fourteenth Air Force in China, advocated building the B-29 bases near Kweilin so that they were located closer to Japan, it was judged that this area was too vulnerable to counter-attack.^[25] The decision to build airstrips at Chengtu meant that, of the Japanese home islands, only Kyūshū would be within range of the bombers.^[26]

XX Bomber Command was assigned responsibility for Operation Matterhorn, and its ground crew began to leave the United States for India during December 1943.^[27][28] The Twentieth Air Force was formed in April 1944 to oversee all B-29 operations. In an unprecedented move, the commander of the USAAF, General Henry H. Arnold, took personal command of this unit and ran it from the Pentagon.^[29] The 58th Bombardment Wing was XX Bomber Command's main combat unit, and its movement from Kansas to India took place between April and mid-May 1944.^[30]

The Japanese military began transferring fighter aircraft from China and the Pacific to the home islands in early 1944 in anticipation of B-29 raids. The IJAAF established three air divisions to defend Honshū and Kyūshū, and the IJN also contributed air units to support the Army. Further anti-aircraft gun batteries and searchlight units were also formed to protect major cities and military bases. These defenses remained inadequate, however, as Japan had few aircraft and anti-aircraft guns capable of effectively engaging B-29s at their cruising altitude of 30,000 feet (9,100 m) and only a small number of radar stations were established to provide early warning of raids.^[31]

In response to the Doolittle Raid and the threat of further attacks, the Japanese Government also sought to improve the country's civil defenses. The national government placed the burden of constructing civilian air-raid shelters on the prefecture governments. These governments built few shelters, however, as construction work was hindered by shortages of concrete and steel. In October 1943 the Ministry of Home Affairs directed households in the major cities to build their own shelters, though these were normally only trenches.^[14] Tunnels and natural caves were later used to shelter civilians from B-29 raids, and less than two percent of civilians had access to bombproof air-raid shelters. A small number of sophisticated shelters were constructed for air defense headquarters and to protect key telephone facilities.^[32] Following the outbreak of war, the Ministry of Home Affairs expanded the number of firefighters, though these generally remained amateur volunteers who lacked adequate training and equipment.^[33] Civilians were also trained to fight fires and encouraged to swear an 'air defense oath' to respond to attacks from incendiary or high explosive bombs.^[34]

The Japanese Government took further steps to prepare the country's major cities for air attacks from the autumn of 1943. In November that year, an air defense general headquarters was established and a program of demolishing large numbers of buildings in major cities to create firebreaks began during December. By the end of the war 614,000 housing units had been destroyed to clear firebreaks; these accounted for a fifth of all housing losses in Japan during the war and displaced 3.5 million people.^[35] The Japanese Government also encouraged old people, children and women in cities which were believed likely to be attacked to evacuate to the countryside from December 1943, and a program of evacuating entire classes of schoolchildren was implemented. By August 1944 330,000 schoolchildren had been evacuated in school groups and another 459,000 had moved to the countryside with their family.^[34] Little was done to disperse industrial facilities so they were less vulnerable to attack, however, as this was logistically difficult.^[36]

Attacks from China

XX Bomber Command began flying missions against Japan in mid-June 1944. The first raid took place on the night of 15/16 June when 75 B-29s were dispatched to attack the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata in northern Kyūshū. This attack caused little damage and cost seven B-29s, but received enthusiastic media coverage in the United States and indicated to Japanese civilians that the war was not going well.^[37][38] Shortly after this raid Arnold relieved XX Bomber Command's commander, Brigadier General Kenneth Wolfe, when he was unable to make follow-up attacks on Japan due to insufficient fuel stockpiles at the bases in China. Wolfe's replacement was Major General Curtis LeMay, a veteran of Eighth Air Force bombing attacks against Germany.^[39]

Subsequent B-29 raids staging through China were generally not successful. The second raid took place on 7 July when 17 B-29s attacked Sasebo, Ōmura and Tobata, causing little damage, and on the night of 10/11 August 24 Superfortresses attacked Nagasaki. Another unsuccessful raid was conducted against Yawata on 20 August in which the B-29 force was intercepted by over 100 fighters. Twelve of the 61 Superfortresses that reached the target area were shot down, including one which was destroyed in a suicide ramming attack.^[40] Japanese Government propaganda claimed that 100 bombers had been downed during this attack, and one of the crashed B-29s was placed on display in Tokyo.^[41] XX Bomber Command's performance improved after LeMay instituted a training program and improved the organization of the B-29's maintenance units during August and September. A successful raid was mounted against Ōmura on 25 October which destroyed the city's small aircraft factory, though a follow-up raid on 11 November was not successful. The city was attacked again by 61 B-29s on 21 November and by 17 bombers on 19 December. XX Bomber Command made its ninth and final raid on Japan on 6 January 1945 when 28 B-29s once again bombed Ōmura. During the same period the command conducted a number of attacks on targets in Manchuria, China and Formosa from its bases in China as well as striking targets in South East Asia from India. The command flew its final mission from India, a raid on Singapore, on 29 March and its constituent units were then transferred to the Mariana Islands.^[42]

Operation Matterhorn was not successful. The nine raids conducted against Japan via bases in China succeeded only in destroying Ōmura's aircraft factory. XX Bomber Command lost 125 B-29s during all of its operations from bases in India and China, though only 29 were destroyed by Japanese forces.^[43] The attacks had a limited impact on Japanese civilian morale and forced the Japanese military to reinforce the home islands' air defenses at the expense of other areas. These limited successes did not justify the large allocation of Allied resources to the operation, however. Moreover, the diversion of some of the supply aircraft flown between India and China to support XX Bomber Command's efforts may have prevented the Fourteenth Air Force from undertaking more effective operations against Japanese positions and shipping. The official history of the USAAF judged that the difficulty of transporting adequate supplies to India and China was the most important factor behind the failure of Operation Matterhorn, though technical problems with the B-29s and the inexperience of their crews also hindered the campaign.^[44] The adverse weather conditions which were common over Japan also limited the effectiveness of the Superfortresses, as crews which managed to reach the target were frequently unable to bomb accurately due to high winds or cloud cover.^[26]

Initial attacks from the Mariana Islands

United States Marine Corps and Army forces captured the Japanese-held islands of Guam, Saipan and Tinian in the Mariana Islands between June and August 1944.^[45] During the subsequent months, USAAF and U.S. Navy engineers constructed six massive airfields on the islands capable of accommodating hundreds of B-29s.^[46] These bases were much better suited to supporting an intensive air campaign against Japan than those in China as they could be easily supplied by sea and lay just 1,500 miles (2,400 km) south of Japan, allowing B-29s to strike most of the home islands.^[1] Japanese aircraft made several attacks on the airfield at Saipan while it was under construction.^[47]

The Twentieth Air Force's XXI Bomber Command began to arrive in the Mariana Islands during October 1944. The Command was led by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, who had also participated in Eighth Air Force operations against Germany. XXI Bomber Command B-29s flew six practice missions against targets in the Central Pacific during October and November in preparation for their first attack on Japan.^[48] On 1 November a F-13 photo reconnaissance variant of the B-29 from the 3d Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron overflew Tokyo; this was the first American aircraft to fly over the city since the Doolittle Raid. Further F-13 sorties were conducted during early November to gather intelligence on aircraft plants and port facilities in the Tokyo–Yokosuka area. As these aircraft flew at both a high speed and high altitude, the F-13s were generally able to evade the heavy anti-aircraft fire they attracted and the large numbers of Japanese fighters which were scrambled to intercept them.^[49]

XXI Bomber Command's initial attacks on Japan were focused on the country's aircraft industry.^[50] The first attack, codenamed Operation San Antonio I, was made against the Musashino aircraft plant in the outskirts of Tokyo on 24 November 1944. Only 24 of the 111 B-29s dispatched attacked the primary target, and the others bombed port facilities as well as industrial and urban areas. The Americans were intercepted by 125 Japanese fighters but only one B-29 was shot down.^[1] This attack caused some damage to the aircraft plant and further reduced Japanese civilians' confidence in the country's air defenses.^[51] In response to this raid, the Japanese military stepped-up its air attacks on B-29 bases in the Mariana Islands from 27 November; these raids continued until January 1945 and resulted in the destruction of 11 Superfortresses and damage to another 43 for the loss of approximately 37 Japanese aircraft.^[52] The IJA also began launching fire balloons against the United States during November. This campaign caused little damage and was abandoned in March 1945; by this time 9,000 balloons had been dispatched but only 285 were reported to have reached the United States.^[53]

The next American raids on Japan were not successful. XXI Bomber Command attacked Tokyo a further three times between 27 November and 3 December; two of these attacks were made against the Musashino aircraft plant while the other targeted an industrial area using M-69 Incendiary cluster bombs which had been specifically developed to attack Japanese urban areas.^[54] Little damage was caused to the aircraft plant attacked on 27 November and 3 December as high winds and clouds prevented accurate bombing. The incendiary raid conducted on the night of 29/30 November by 29 Superfortresses burnt out one tenth of a square mile and was also judged to be unsuccessful by the Twentieth Air Force's headquarters.^[55]

Four of XXI Bomber Command's next five raids were made against targets in Nagoya. The first two of these attacks on 13 and 18 December used precision bombing tactics, and damaged the city's aircraft plants.^[56] The third raid was a daylight incendiary attack which was conducted after the Twentieth Air Force directed that 100 B-29s armed with M-69 bombs be dispatched against Nagoya to test the effectiveness of these weapons on a Japanese city. Hansell protested this order as he believed that precision attacks were starting to produce results and moving to area bombardment would be counter-productive, but agreed to the operation after he was assured that it did not represent a general shift in tactics.^[57] Despite the change in armament, the 22 December raid was planned as a precision attack on an aircraft factory using only 78 bombers, and bad weather over Nagoya meant that little damage was caused.^[58] XXI Bomber Command raided the Musashino aircraft plant in Tokyo again on 27 December, but did not damage the facility. On 3 January 1945, 97 B-29s were dispatched to conduct an area bombing raid on Nagoya. This attack started several fires, but these were quickly brought under control.^[59]

In late December 1944 Arnold, who was disappointed with the results XXI Bomber Command had achieved up to that time, decided to relieve Hansell of his command and replace him with LeMay. The official history of the USAAF states that this decision was influenced by Arnold's desire that the command rapidly produce results and Hansell continuing to focus on precision bombing when the Twentieth Air Force headquarters wanted a greater emphasis placed on area attacks. Due to his success in improving XX Bomber Command's performance, LeMay was seen as being able to solve the problems which were affecting XXI Bomber Command. Hansell was informed of Arnold's decision on 6 January, but remained in his position until mid-January.^[60] During this period, XXI Bomber Command conducted unsuccessful precision bombing attacks on the Musashino aircraft plant in Tokyo and a Mitsubishi Aircraft Works factory in Nagoya on 9 and 14 January respectively. The last attack planned by Hansell was more successful, however, with a force of 77 B-29s crippling a Kawasaki Aircraft Industries factory near Akashi on 19 January.^[61] During XXI Bomber Command's first three months of operations it suffered an average loss rate of 4.1 percent of aircraft dispatched in each raid.^[62]

In late January 1945 the Imperial General Headquarters belatedly adopted a civil defense plan to counter American air raids. This plan assigned responsibility for fighting fires to community councils and neighborhood groups as the professional firefighting units were short-handed. Civilians were to observe a blackout from 10:00 pm. Japanese positions in the Bonin Islands were normally able to provide a hour's warning of American raids and air raid sirens were sounded in cities threatened by attack.^[63]

The first attacks conducted under LeMay's leadership achieved mixed results. XXI Bomber Command flew six major missions between 23 January and 19 February with limited success, though an incendiary raid against Kobe on 4 February caused significant damage to the city and its main factories.^[64] Moreover, while improved maintenance procedures implemented by LeMay reduced the number of B-29s which had to return to base during raids due to technical problems, the command suffered a loss rate of 5.1 percent in these operations.^[65] From 19 February to 3 March XXI Bomber Command conducted a series of precision bombing raids on aircraft factories which sought to tie down Japanese air units so they could not participate in the Battle of Iwo Jima. These attacks were frustrated by high winds and cloud cover, and little damage was inflicted on the factories. A firebombing raid conducted against Tokyo by 172 B-29s on 25 February was considered successful, however, as it burnt or damaged approximately one square mile of the city's urban area.^[66] This attack was conducted as a large-scale test of the effectiveness of firebombing.^[67]

Several factors explain the poor results of XXI Bomber Command's precision bombing campaign. The most important of these was the weather; the American raiders frequently encountered cloudy conditions and high winds over Japan which made accurate bombing extremely difficult. Moreover, the bomber forces often had to pass through severe weather fronts between the Mariana Islands and Japan and these acted to break up formations and cause navigation problems. XXI Bomber Command's effectiveness was also limited by poor B-29 maintenance practices and over-crowding at its airfields – these factors reduced the number of aircraft which were available for operations and complicated the process of launching and recovering forces of bombers.^[68]

Firebombing attacks

LeMay changes tactics

The USAAF had been assessing the feasibility of a firebombing campaign against Japanese cities since 1943. USAAF planners had determined that Japan's industry was concentrated in a small number of large cities and a high proportion of industrial production took place in residential homes and small factories located in urban areas. As a result, it was estimated that incendiary bomb attacks on Japan's six largest cities could have a major impact on the country's industrial production through causing physical damage to almost 40 percent of key industrial facilities as well as the loss of 7.6 million man-months of labor. It was estimated that such attacks would kill over 500,000 people, render about 7.75 million homeless and force almost 3.5 million to be evacuated to other areas.^[69] In preparation for such attacks the USAAF had tested the effectiveness of incendiary bombs on Japanese-style buildings at Eglin Field and the "Japanese village" at Dugway Proving Ground.^[70] The American military also attempted to develop "bat bombs", which would have involved using air-dropped bats armed with incendiary bombs to attack Japanese cities, but this project was abandoned in 1944.^[71]

In light of the poor results of precision bombing campaign and the success of the 25 February raid on Tokyo, LeMay decided to begin firebombing attacks on Japan's main cities during early March.^[72] This was in line with Arnold's targeting directive for XXI Bomber Command, which specified that Japan's urban areas should be given the second-highest priority for attacks after aircraft factories. The directive also specified that firebombing raids be conducted once M-69 bombs had been tested in combat and the number of B-29s available was sufficient to launch an intensive campaign.^[73] LeMay did not seek Arnold's specific approval before launching his firebombing campaign, however, to protect the USAAF's commander from criticism if the attacks were unsuccessful. The Twentieth Air Force's Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Lauris Norstad, was aware of the change in tactics though and provided support.^[74] To improve the effectiveness of the firebombing attacks, LeMay ordered the B-29s to fly at the low altitude of 5,000 feet (1,500 m) and bomb by night; this represented a significant change from the Command's standard tactics which focused on high altitude daylight bombing. As Japan's force of night fighters was weak and its anti-aircraft batteries were less effective at night, LeMay also had most of the B-29s' defensive guns removed so they could carry more bombs.^[67] These changes were not popular with XXI Bomber Command's aircrew, as they believed that it was safer to fly heavily armed B-29s at high altitude.^[75]

March firebombing campaign

The first firebombing attack in this campaign was carried out against Tokyo on the night of 9/10 March, and proved to be the single most destructive air raid of the war.^[76] XXI Bomber Command mounted a maximum effort for this operation, and on the afternoon of 9 March 346 B-29s left the Marianas bound for Tokyo. They began to arrive over the city at 2:00 am Guam time on 10 March, and 279 bombers dropped 1,665 tons of bombs.^[77] This caused a massive firestorm that overwhelmed Tokyo's civil defenses and destroyed 16 square miles (41 km²) of buildings, representing seven percent of the city's urban area.^[78] The Japanese police estimated that 83,793 people were killed, another 40,918 were injured and just over a million lost their homes; postwar estimates of deaths in this attack have ranged from 80,000 to 100,000.^[79][80] Damage to Tokyo's war production was also substantial.^[79] Japanese opposition to this attack was relatively weak, and American losses were limited to 14 B-29s destroyed as a result of combat or mechanical faults and a further 42 damaged by anti-aircraft fire.^[81] Following the attack on Tokyo, the Japanese Government ordered that all schoolchildren in the third to sixth grades be evacuated from the main cities, and 87 percent of them had been moved to the countryside by early April.^[34]

XXI Bomber Command followed up the firebombing of Tokyo with similar raids against other major cities. On 11 March, 310 B-29s were dispatched against Nagoya. The bombing of the city was less concentrated than that of Tokyo, and the attack caused less damage. Nevertheless 2.05 square miles (5.3 km²) were burnt out and no B-29s were lost to the Japanese defenses. On the night of 13/14 March, 274 Superfortresses attacked Osaka and destroyed 8.1 square miles (21 km²) of the city for the loss of two aircraft. Kobe was the next target in the firebombing campaign, and was attacked by 331 B-29s on the night of 16/17 March. The resulting firestorm destroyed 7 square miles (18 km²) of the city (equivalent to half its area) and three B-29s were lost. Nagoya was attacked again on the night of 18/19 March, and the B-29s destroyed 2.95 square miles (7.6 km²) of buildings. Only one Superfortress was shot down during this attack and all members of its crew were rescued. This attack marked the end of the first firebombing campaign as XXI Bomber Command had exhausted its supplies of incendiary bombs.^[82] The Command's next major raid was an unsuccessful night precision attack on the Mitsubishi aircraft engine factory conducted on the night of 23/24 March; during this operation five of the 251 aircraft dispatched were shot down.^[83] In addition to these operations, B-29s began dropping propaganda leaflets over Japan during March. These leaflets called on Japanese civilians to overthrow their government or face destruction.^[84]

The USAAF assessed that the firebombing campaign had been highly successful, and it was noted that American losses during these attacks had been much lower than those incurred during day precision raids. As a result, the Joint Target Group drew up a new set of priorities for XXI Bomber Command which left aircraft engine factories as the Command's first priority but placed stronger emphasis on continuing the attacks on Japan's main urban areas. While this bombing campaign was intended to form part of preparations for the Allied invasion of Japan, LeMay and some members of Arnold's staff believed that it alone would be sufficient to force the country's surrender.^[85]

The Japanese Government was concerned about the results of the March firebombing attacks. The raids had demonstrated that the Japanese military was unable to protect the nation's airspace and that as a result the American bombers could cause widespread damage while suffering only light losses. In addition to the extensive physical damage, the raids also caused increased absenteeism in the cities which were attacked as civilians were afraid to leave their homes and work in factories which might be bombed.^[86]

Destruction of Japan's main cities

The expanded firebombing campaign was delayed by using B-29s to support the Allied forces engaged in the Battle of Okinawa. In an attempt to reduce kamikaze suicide attacks on the Allied invasion fleet, XXI Bomber Command was directed to attack airfields in southern Japan. These attacks began on 20 March and were expanded from 27 March.^[87] On 3  March, the day before the landing, XXI Bomber Command mounted a diversionary precision bombing attack on industrial facilities at Tachiarai and an airfield at Ōmura. Despite these raids, large-scale kamikaze attacks were conducted against the Allied ships following the landing. As part of the Allied response, XXI Bomber Command conducted major attacks on airfields in Kyushu on 8 and 16 April, though the first of these attacks was diverted to strike residential areas in Kagoshima after the airfields were found to be covered by cloud. From 17 April until 11 May, when the B-29s were released for other duties, about three quarters of XXI Bomber Command's effort was devoted to attacking airfields and other targets in direct support of the Battle of Okinawa; this included 2,104 sorties flown against 17 airfields. These raids cost the Command 24 B-29s destroyed and 233 damaged and were not successful in completely suppressing kamikaze attacks from the airfields which were bombed.^[88][89]

Limited attacks on Japanese cities were conducted while the Battle of Okinawa continued. A night precision bombing raid was flown against the Nakajima engine factory in Tokyo by 121 B-29s on 1 April and three similar attacks were conducted against engine factories in Shizuoka, Koizumi and Tachikawa on the night of 3 April. These raids were unsuccessful as XXI Bomber Command lacked the specialized equipment needed to strike targets accurately at night, and LeMay decided against further such attacks.^[90] Small forces of B-29s struck Tokyo and nearby Kawasaki on 4 April. Two successful large-scale precision bombing raids were flown against aircraft factories in Tokyo and Nagoya on 7 April; the raid on Tokyo was the first to be escorted by Iwo Jima-based P-51 Mustang very long range fighters from the VII Fighter Command, and the Americans claimed to have shot down 101 Japanese aircraft for the loss of two P-51s and seven B-29s.^[91][92]

Over 250 B-29s struck three different aircraft factories on 12 April, and the 73rd Bombardment Wing inflicted heavy damage on the Musashino aircraft plant which had been attacked nine times previously.^[93][94] LeMay resumed night firebombing raids on 13 April when 327 B-29s attacked the arsenal district of Tokyo, destroying 11.4 square miles (30 km²) of the city, including several armaments factories. On 15 April, 303 Superfortresses attacked the Tokyo region and destroyed 6 square miles (16 km²) of Tokyo, 3.6 square miles (9.3 km²) of Kawasaki and 1.5 square miles (3.9 km²) of Yokohama for the loss of 12 bombers.^[92][95] On 24 April the Tachikawa aircraft engine factory at Yamato near Tokyo was destroyed by 131 B-29s. An attack on the aircraft arsenal at Tachikawa six days later was aborted due to cloud cover; some of the heavy bombers attacked the city of Hamamatsu instead. Another precision raid was made against the Hiro Naval Aircraft Factory at Kure on 5 May when 148 B-29s inflicted heavy damage on the facility.^[96] Five days later B-29s successfully attacked oil storage facilities at Iwakuni, Ōshima and Toyama.^[97] On 11 May a small force of B-29s also destroyed an airframe factory at Konan.^[96] XXI Bomber Command reached its full strength in April when the 58th and 315th Bombardment Wings arrived in the Marianas; at this time the command comprised five wings equipped with B-29s and was the most powerful air unit in the world.^[98]

From mid-May XXI Bomber Command conducted an intensive firebombing campaign against Japan's main cities. A force of 472 B-29s struck Nagoya by day on 13 May and destroyed 3.15 square miles (8.2 km²) of the city. The Japanese mounted a strong defense which downed two Superfortresses and damaged another 64 (another eight B-29s were lost to other causes) and the Americans claimed 18 Japanese fighter "kills" as well as another 30 "probables" and 16 damaged. Nagoya was attacked again by 457 B-29s on the night of 16 May, and the resulting fires destroyed 3.82 square miles (9.9 km²) of the city. Japanese defenses were much weaker by night, and all of the three bombers which were lost in this attack crashed due to mechanical problems. The two raids on Nagoya killed 3,866 Japanese and rendered another 472,701 homeless.^[99] On 19 May, 318 B-29s conducted an unsuccessful precision bombing raid on the Tachikawa Aircraft Company.^[100] XXI Bomber Command made further large-scale firebombing attacks against Tokyo on the nights of 23 and 25 May. In the first of these raids 520 B-29s destroyed 5.3 square miles (14 km²) of southern Tokyo for the loss of 17 aircraft and 69 damaged.^[101] The second attack involved 502 B-29 and destroyed 16.8 square miles (44 km²) of the city's central area, including the headquarters of several key government ministries and much of the Tokyo Imperial Palace. Japanese defenses were relatively successful, with 26 B-29s being shot down and another 100 damaged.^[102][103] By the end of these raids just over half (50.8 percent) of Tokyo had been destroyed and the city was removed from XXI Bomber Command's target list.^[104] The command's last major raid of May was a daylight incendiary attack on Yokohama on 29 May conducted by 517 B-29s escorted by 101 P-51s. This force was intercepted by 150 A6M Zero fighters, sparking an intense air battle in which five B-29s were shot down and another 175 damaged. In return, the P-51 pilots claimed 26 "kills" and 23 "probables" for the loss of three fighters. The 454 B-29s which reached Yokohama struck its main business district and destroyed 6.9 square miles (18 km²) of buildings.^[105] Overall, the attacks in May destroyed 94 square miles (240 km²) of buildings, which was equivalent to one seventh of Japan's total urban area. The Minister of Home Affairs, Iwao Yamazaki, concluded after these raids that Japan's civil defense arrangements were "considered to be futile".^[106]

The firebombing campaign against major cities ended in June. On the first day of the month 521 B-29s escorted by 148 P-51s were dispatched in a daylight raid against Osaka. While en-route to the city the Mustangs flew through thick cloud, and 27 of the fighters were destroyed in collisions. Nevertheless 458 heavy bombers and 27 P-51s reached the city, and the bombardment killed 3,960 Japanese and destroyed 3.15 square miles (8.2 km²) of buildings. On 5 June, 473 B-29s struck Kobe by day and destroyed 4.35 square miles (11.3 km²) of the city for the loss of 11 bombers. Osaka was attacked again by 409 B-29s on 7 June, and these destroyed 2.21 square miles (5.7 km²) of the city without loss. Osaka was bombed for the fourth time in the month on 15 June when 444 B-29s destroyed 1.9 square miles (4.9 km²) of buildings in the city and another 0.59 square miles (1.5 km²) in nearby Amagasaki.^[107] This attack marked the end of the first phase of XXI Bomber Command's attack on Japan's cities. During May and June the bombers had destroyed much of the country's six largest cities, killing between 112,000 and 126,762 people and rendering millions homeless. The widespread destruction and high number of casualties from these raids caused many Japanese to realize that their country's military was no longer able to defend the home islands. American losses were low compared to Japanese casualties, with 136 B-29s being downed during the campaign.^{[108][109][110]}

Attacks on small cities

In mid-June Arnold visited LeMay's headquarters at Saipan. On 14 June he approved a proposal to send the B-29s against 25 relatively small cities with populations ranging from 62,280 to 323,000, as well as continuing to make precision attacks on key targets. This decision was made despite a recommendation from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) team which was assessing the effectiveness of air attacks on Germany that raids on Japan should be focused on the country's transportation network and other targets with the goal of crippling the movement of goods and destroying food supplies.^[111] LeMay's plan called for precision attacks on important industrial targets on days where the weather over Japan was clear and incendiary attacks guided by radar on overcast days. As both the cities and industrial facilities targeted were relatively small, the B-29 force would be sent against multiple locations on days in which attacks were conducted. This targeting policy, which was labeled the "Empire Plan", remained in force until the last days of the war.^[112]

Five major precision bombing attacks were conducted as part of the "Empire Plan". On 9 June, two groups of B-29s bombed an aircraft factory at Narao and another two groups raided a factory in Atsuta; both facilities were badly damaged. A single group of Superfortresses also attempted to bomb a Kawasaki Aircraft Industries factory at Akashi but accidentally struck a nearby village instead. The next day XXI Bomber Command bombers escorted by 107 P-51s successfully attacked six different factories in the Tokyo Bay region.^[113] The next precision bombing raids were conducted on 22 June, when 382 B-29s attacked six targets at Kure, Kakamigahara, Himeji, Mizushima and Akashi in southern Honshu. Most of the factories targeted in these raids were badly damaged.^[114] Four days later, 510 B-29s escorted by 148 P-51s were sent against nine factories in southern Honshu and Shikoku. Heavy cloud over the region meant that many of these bombers attacked targets of opportunity individually or in small groups, and little damage was done to most of the raid's intended targets.^[115] Cloudy weather prevented any further large-scale precision attacks until 24 July, when 625 B-29s were dispatched against seven targets near Nagoya and Osaka. Four of the factories attacked suffered heavy damage. Renewed cloudy weather prevented any further "Empire Plan" precision attacks from being conducted.^[115]

XXI Bomber Command began incendiary raids against small cities from 17 June. On that night, Hamamatsu, Kagoshima, Ōmuta, Yokkaichi were each attacked by a wing of B-29s using similar tactics to those employed in the firebombing raids against the major cities. Of the 477 B-29s dispatched, 456 struck their targets and Hamamatsu, Kagoshima, Yokkaichi suffered extensive damage; overall 6.073 square miles (15.73 km²) of buildings were destroyed. The cities were almost undefended and no B-29s were lost to Japanese actions.^[116][117] This operation was judged a success, and set the pattern for XXI Bomber Command's firebombing attacks until the end of the war. As the campaign continued and the most important cities were destroyed, the bombers were sent against smaller and less significant cities. On the nights that raids were conducted four cities were normally attacked, each by a wing of bombers. Two-wing operations were conducted against Fukuoka on 19 June and Ōmuta on 26 July, however. Sixteen multi-city incendiary attacks were conducted by the end of the war (an average of two per week), with 58 different cities being struck in this period. The incendiary raids were coordinated with precision bombing attacks during the last weeks of the war in an attempt to force the Japanese Government to surrender.^[118] As the small cities were not defended by anti-aircraft guns and Japan's night fighter force was ineffective only a single B-29 was shot down during this campaign; a further 66 were damaged and 18 were lost in accidents.^[119]

The firebombing campaign against small cities continued through June and July. On the night of 19 June B-29s struck Fukuoka, Shizuoka and Toyohashi. On 28 June Moji, Nobeoka, Okayama and Sasebo were attacked. Kumamoto, Kure, Shimonoseki and Ube were struck on 1 July. Two nights later, Himeji, Kōchi, Takamatsu and Tokushima were bombed. On 6 July, Akashi, Chiba, Kōfu and Shimizu were attacked. Gifu, Sakai, Sendai and Wakayama were struck on 9 July. Three nights later, the B-29s targeted Ichinomiya, Tsuruga, Utsunomiya and Uwajima. On 16 July, Hiratsuka, Kuwana, Namazu and Ōita were attacked. Choshi, Fukui, Hitachi, Okazaki were bombed on 19 July. After a break of almost a week, Matsuyama, Omuta and Tokuyama were firebombed on 26 July.^[120]

The XXI Bomber Command stepped up its propaganda campaign as attacks on Japanese cities intensified. It has been estimated that B-29s dropped 10 million leaflets in May, 20 million in June and 30 million in July. The Japanese Government implemented harsh penalties against civilians who kept copies of these leaflets.^[121] On the night of 27/28 July six B-29s dropped leaflets over 11 Japanese cities warning that they would be attacked in the future; this was intended to lower the morale of Japanese civilians and convince them that the United States was seeking to minimize civilian casualties.^[122] Six of these cities (Aomori, Ichinomiya, Tsu, Uji-Yamada Ōgaki and Uwajima) were attacked on 28 July. No B-29s were lost in the raids on these cities, though six were damaged by attacks from between 40 and 50 fighters and another five were damaged by anti-aircraft fire.^[119]

August 1945 began with further large-scale raids against Japanese cities. On the first of the month 836 B-29s staged the largest single raid of World War II, dropping 6,145 tons of bombs and mines. The cities of Hachiōji, Mito, Nagaoka and Toyama were the main targets of this operation; all four suffered extensive damage with 99.5 percent of buildings in Toyama being destroyed.^[123][124] The cities of Imabari, Maebashi, Nishinomiya and Saga were attacked on 5 August.^[124] These raids had also been preceded by propaganda leaflets and radio broadcasts from Saipan warning that the cities would be attacked.^[119]

From late June the 315th Bombardment Wing conducted a series of night precision bombing attacks against the Japanese oil industry which were made independently of the precision day and night incendiary raids. This wing's B-29s were fitted with the advanced AN/APQ-7 radar which allowed targets to be accurately located at night. It arrived in the Marianas in April 1945 and, after a period of operational training, flew its first attack against the Utsube Oil Refinery at Yokkaichi on the night of 26 June.^[125] The 30 bombers (out of 38 dispatched) which struck the refinery destroyed or damaged 30 percent of the facility.^[126] The unit's next attack was made against a refinery at Kudamatsu three nights later, and on the night of 2 July it struck another refinery at Minoshima.^[127] On the night of 6/7 July the 315th Bombardment Wing destroyed the Maruzen oil refinery near Osaka, and three nights later it completed the destruction of the Utsube refinery.^[126] The wing had conducted 15 operations against Japanese oil facilities by the end of the war. During these attacks it destroyed six of the nine targets attacked for the loss of four B-29s. As Japan had almost no crude oil to refine as a result of the Allied naval blockade of the home islands, the raids against oil refineries had almost no impact on the country's war effort.^[128]

During mid-July the USAAF strategic bomber forces in the Pacific were reorganized. On 16 July XXI Bomber Command was re-designated the Twentieth Air Force and LeMay appointed its commander. Two days later the United States Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific (USASTAF) was established at Guam under the command of General Carl Spaatz. USASTAF's role was to command the Twentieth Air Force as well as the Eighth Air Force, which at the time was being reequipped with B-29s and moving from Europe to Okinawa under the command of James Doolittle (who had been promoted to a general). The Commonwealth Tiger Force, which was to include Australian, British, Canadian and New Zealand heavy bomber squadrons and attack Japan from Okinawa, was also to come under the command of USASTAF when it arrived in the region during late 1945.^[122][129]

Aerial mine laying

From mid-1944, the U.S. Navy pressed for B-29s to be used to lay naval mines in Japan's home waters to strengthen the blockade of the country. Arnold and his staff were unenthusiastic about the Navy's proposals, as they believed that such missions required diverting too many Superfortresses from precision bombing attacks. However, in response to repeated requests from the Navy Arnold decided in November 1944 to begin mine laying operations once sufficient aircraft were available. In January 1945 LeMay selected the 313th Bombardment Wing to be the Twentieth Air Force's specialist mine laying unit, and the Navy provided assistance with its training and logistics. LeMay also developed a plan designated Operation Starvation to use air-dropped mines to implement a blockade of Japan.^[130] As the United States had only occasionally used mines up to this time, the Japanese military had placed relatively little emphasis on keeping its minesweeping force up to date. As a result, the Japanese were unprepared for a large-scale offensive.^[131]

The 313th Bombardment Wing conducted its first mine-laying operation on the night of 27/28 March when it mined the Shimonoseki Strait to prevent Japanese warships from using this route to attack the US landing force off Okinawa.^[132] Mine-laying operations were disrupted in April as the wing was assigned to support operations in Okinawa and participate in conventional bombing raids. Its rate of effort increased in May, with missions being conducted against harbors and other choke points around Honshu and Kyushu. From an early stage the air-dropped minefields greatly disrupted Japanese coastal shipping, and they sank more ships than Allied submarines during May.^[133]

LeMay ordered a further increase to mine-laying sorties in June, and the 505th Bombardment Group joined the 313th Bombardment Wing on occasion. In response to this offensive, the Japanese greatly expanded their mine-sweeping force by 349 ships and 20,000 men and deployed additional anti-aircraft guns around the Shimonoseki Strait. They had little success in permanently clearing minefields or downing the B-29s, however. Many of Japan's major harbors, including those of Tokyo, Yokohama and Nagoya, became permanently closed to shipping. During the last weeks of the war, B-29s continued to drop large numbers of mines off Japan and the campaign was expanded into Korean waters. The 313th Bombardment Wing lost only 16 B-29s during mine-laying operations.^[134] Overall, mines dropped by Superfortresses off the Japanese home islands sank 293 ships, which represented 9.3 percent of all Japanese merchant shipping destroyed during the Pacific War and 60 percent of losses between April and August 1945. Following the war, the USSBS assessed that the Twentieth Air Force should have placed a greater emphasis on attacking Japanese shipping, including conducting a more intensive mine-laying effort, given the effectiveness of these attacks.^[131][135]

Naval air attacks

The U.S. Navy conducted its first attacks against the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle Raid in mid-February 1945. This operation was undertaken primarily to destroy Japanese aircraft which could attack the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces involved with the landing on Iwo Jima on the 19th of the month, and was conducted by Task Force 58 (TF 58). The task force was the U.S. Navy's main striking force in the Pacific, and comprised 11 fleet carriers, five light aircraft carriers and a powerful force of escorts.^[136] TF 58 approached Japan undetected, and attacked airfields and aircraft factories in the Tokyo region on 16 and 17 February. The American naval aviators claimed 341 "kills" against Japanese aircraft and the destruction of a further 160 on the ground for the loss of 60 aircraft in combat and 28 in accidents. Several ships were also attacked and sunk in Tokyo Bay.^[137] The actual Japanese aircraft losses in this operation are uncertain, however; the Imperial General Headquarters admitted losing 78 aircraft in dogfights and did not provide a figure for those destroyed on the ground. TF 58's ships were not attacked during this period in Japanese waters, and on 18 February sailed south to provide direct support to the landings on Iwo Jima. The Task Force attempted further attacks on the Tokyo area on 25 February, but these were largely frustrated by bad weather and the ships sailed south to attack Okinawa from 1 March instead.^[138]

TF 58 renewed its attacks on Japan in mid-March in an attempt to reduce the Japanese aircraft available to contest the landing on Okinawa on 1 April.^[139] On 18 March carrier aircraft struck Japanese airfields and other military facilities on Kyushu. The next day they attacked Japanese warships at Kure and Kobe, damaging the battleship Yamato and aircraft carrier Amagi. The Japanese fought back against these raids with kamikaze suicide aircraft and conventional attacks, and inflicted light damage on three carriers on 18 March and severely damaged USS Franklin the next day.^[140] On 20 March TF 58 sailed south but continued fighter sweeps over Kyushu to suppress Japanese aircraft. During the attacks on 18 and 19 March the American naval aviators claimed to have destroyed 223 Japanese aircraft in the air and 250 on the ground while the Japanese placed their losses as 161 of the 191 aircraft they committed in the air and an unspecified number on the ground.^[141] From 23 March TF 58 conducted strikes against Okinawa, though its aircraft made further sweeps of Kyushu on the 28th and 29th of the month. Following the landing on 1 April TF 58 provided air defense for the naval force off Okinawa and regularly conducted patrols over Kyushu. In an attempt to stem the large-scale Japanese air attacks against the Allied ships, part of TF 58 struck at kamikaze aircraft bases on Kyushu and Shikoku on 12 and 13 May.^[142] On 27 May, Admiral William Halsey assumed command of the Fifth Fleet from Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and it was redesignated the Third Fleet; as part of this change TF 58 became TF 38.^[143] The task force continued operations off Okinawa in late May and June, and on 2 and 3 June one of its task groups attacked airfields on Kyushu.^[144] Another attack was made against these airfields on 8 June, and on the 10th of the month TF 38 left Japanese waters for a period of recuperation at Leyte in the Philippines.^[145]

On 1 July TF 38 sailed from Leyte to strike at the Japanese home islands. At this time it comprised nine fleet carriers, six light carriers and their escorts.^[146] On 10 July the Task Force's aircraft conducted raids on airfields in the Tokyo region, destroying several aircraft on the ground. No Japanese fighters were encountered in the air, however, as they were being kept in reserve for a planned large-scale suicide attack on the Allied fleet.^[147][148] Following this raid TF 38 steamed north, and began a major attack on Hokkaido and northern Honshu on 14 July. These strikes continued the next day, and sank eight of the 12 railway car ferries which carried coal from Hokkaido to Honshu and damaged the remaining four. Many other ships were also destroyed in this area, including 70 out of the 272 small sailing ships which carried coal between the islands. Once again no Japanese aircraft opposed this attack, though 25 were destroyed on the ground.^[149] The loss of the railway car ferries reduced the amount of coal shipped from Hokkaido to Honshu by 80 percent, which greatly hindered production in Honshu's factories.^[150] This was the single most effective strategic air attack of the Pacific War.^[151] TF 38's battleships and cruisers also began a series of bombardments of industrial targets on 14 July which continued until almost the end of the war.^[152]

Following the attacks on Hokkaido and northern Honshu TF 38 sailed south and was reinforced by the main body of the British Pacific Fleet, which was designated Task Force 37 and included another four fleet carriers.^[153][154] Strikes on the Tokyo area on 17 July were disrupted by bad weather, but the next day aircraft from the fleet attacked Yokosuka naval base where they damaged the battleship Nagato and sank four other warships.^[154][155] On 24, 25 and 28 July the Allied fleet attacked Kure and the Inland Sea and sank an aircraft carrier and three battleships, as well as two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and several other warships.^[156] A force of 79 USAAF Liberators flying from Okinawa participated in this attack on 28 July.^[157] Allied casualties were heavy, however, with 126 aircraft being shot down.^[158] On 29 and 30 July the carrier aircraft struck at Maizuru, sinking three small warships and 12 merchant vessels, before the fleet sailed east to avoid a typhoon and replenish its supplies.^[159] Its next attacks against Japan took place on 9 and 10 August, and were directed at a build up of Japanese aircraft in northern Honshu which Allied intelligence believed were to be used to conduct a commando raid against the B-29 bases in the Marianas. The naval aviators claimed to have destroyed 251 aircraft in their attacks on 9 August as well as damaging a further 141, though the destroyer USS Borie was badly damaged by a kamikaze while escorting TF 38.^[160] On 13 August, TF 38's aircraft attacked the Tokyo region again and claimed to have destroyed 254 Japanese aircraft on the ground and 18 in the air. Another attack was launched against Tokyo on the morning of 15 August, and the 103 aircraft of its first wave attacked their targets. The second wave aborted its attack when word was received that Japan had agreed to surrender. Several Japanese aircraft attempted to attack TF 38 later that day, however, and were shot down.^[161][162]

Raids from Iwo Jima and Okinawa

While the USAAF P-51 Mustang fighters of the VII Fighter Command which were stationed at Iwo Jima from March 1945 were initially mainly used to escort B-29s, they also conducted a series of independent ground attack missions against targets the Japanese home islands.^[163] The first of these operations took place on 16 April when 57 P-51s strafed Kanoya Air Field in Kyushu.^[164] In operations conducted between 26 April and 22 June the American fighter pilots claimed the destruction of 64 Japanese aircraft and damage to another 180 on the ground as well as a further ten which were shot down in flight; these claims were lower than the American planners had expected, however, and the raids were considered unsuccessful. USAAF losses were 11 P-51s to enemy action and seven to other causes.^[165]

Due to the lack of Japanese air opposition to the American bomber raids, VII Fighter Command was solely tasked with ground attack missions from July. These raids were frequently made against Japanese airfields in an attempt to destroy aircraft which were being held in reserve to attack the Allied invasion force. While the P-51 pilots only occasionally encountered Japanese fighters in the air, the airfields were protected by anti-aircraft batteries and barrage balloons.^[166] By the end of the war VII Fighter Command had conducted 51 ground attack raids, of which 41 were considered successful. The fighter pilots claimed to have destroyed or damaged 1,062 aircraft and 254 ships along with large numbers of buildings and railway rolling stock. American losses were 91 pilots killed and 157 Mustangs destroyed.^[166]

From May 1945 aircraft of the USAAF's Fifth Air Force and Seventh Air Force, which were grouped under the Far East Air Force (FEAF), attacked targets in Kyushu and western Honshu from bases in Okinawa and other locations in the Ryukyu Islands. These raids formed part of the preparation for the invasion of Japan.^[167] From 17 May, P-47 Thunderbolt fighters flying from the Ryukyus made frequent day and night patrols over Kyushu to disrupt the Japanese air units there. On 21 June an additional fighter group joined this effort, and the campaign was reinforced by bombers and another fighter group from 1 July. While these American operations were initially fiercely contested, from early July onwards they encountered little opposition as the Japanese aircraft were withdrawn so that they could be preserved for later operations. Between 1 and 13 July, the Americans flew 286 medium and heavy bomber sorties over Kyushu without loss. As the fighters met few Japanese aircraft, they were mainly used to attack transportation infrastructure and targets of opportunity; these included at least two strafing attacks on groups of civilians.^[168]

Attacks on airfields and transportation infrastructure in southern Japan continued until the end of the war. By this time the Fifth Air Force's bombers had flown 138 sorties against airfields in Kyushu and the Seventh Air Force had conducted a further 784. Road and railway bridges were attacked by both fighters and bombers, and the city of Kagoshima was frequently bombed. Seventh Air Force B-24 Liberators also bombed the railway terminals in the port of Nagasaki on 31 July and 1 August. While these raids were focused on tactical targets, the Okinawa-based aircraft also made strategic attacks against industrial facilities on occasion; these included an unsuccessful raid on a coal liquefaction plant at Ōmuta on 7 August. Bombers of the Fifth and Seventh Air Forces also made firebombing attacks against Tarumizu on 5 August, Kumamoto on 10 August and Kurume the next day. The FEAF staged its last attacks against Japan on 12 August, though aircraft were dispatched on 14 August but recalled while en-route to their targets. Overall, the two air forces flew 6,435 sorties against targets in Kyushu during July and August for the loss of 43 aircraft to Japanese anti-aircraft guns and fighters.^[169]

Japanese military response

Air defenses

Japan's air defenses proved inadequate to stop the Allied air attacks.^[171] Due to the short range of the country's land-based radars and Allied attacks on IJN picket ships, the defenders typically had only about an hour to respond to incoming forces of B-29s once they had been detected. This was not enough time for fighter units to scramble and climb to the B-29s' cruising altitude, and as a result most heavy bomber attacks were intercepted by only small numbers of fighters. Moreover, the American bombers were capable of flying faster at high altitude than many Japanese fighters could. Japanese signals intelligence units could provide longer warning times of incoming raids by eavesdropping on the bombers' radio communications, but were unable to predict the target of the attack.^[172] From August 1944 some Japanese aircraft conducted suicide ramming attacks on B-29s, and several specialized kamikaze fighter units were established in October; by the end of the war ramming tactics had destroyed nine B-29s and damaged another 13 for the loss of 21 fighters.^[173] Japan's anti-aircraft defenses were strengthened from November 1944 when 12-centimeter (4.7 in) anti-aircraft guns began to be issued to supplement the inadequate 7.5-centimeter (3.0 in) and 8-centimeter (3.1 in) weapons.^[173]

Air combat was most intense in late 1944 and early 1945. Following the first B-29 raids on Tokyo, the number of IJN aircraft assigned to air defense duties was greatly increased and all the 12-centimeter (4.7 in) guns were allocated to protect the capital.^[173] Fighters stationed to defend Japan's main industrial areas frequently intercepted American air raids between 24 November 1944 and 25 February 1945, causing significant losses for a period. The number of fighters available declined from late January, however.^[174] The Americans suffered few losses from Japanese fighters during the night raids which were conducted from March 1945 until the end of the war.^[175] The effectiveness of Japanese anti-aircraft batteries decreased during 1945 as the collapse of the national economy led to severe shortages of ammunition.^[176]

Resistance to the air raids decreased sharply from April 1945. On 15 April the IJAAF and IJN air defense units were belatedly placed under a single command when the Air General Army was formed, but by this time the fighter force's effectiveness had been greatly reduced due to high rates of attrition and casualties in training accidents. Due to the poor standard of the remaining pilots and the deployment of P-51 Mustangs to escort B-29s, the Japanese decided in April to place their aircraft in reserve so that they could make counter-attacks against the Allied invasion.^[176] As a result, few of the subsequent Allied air attacks were intercepted.^[176] Moreover, as anti-aircraft guns were mainly stationed around the main industrial areas, many of the raids on small cities were almost unopposed.^[177] Imperial General Headquarters decided to resume attacks on Allied bombers from late June, but by this time there were too few fighters available for the change of tactics to have any results.^[178] During the last weeks of the war Superfortresses were able to operate with near impunity due to the weakness of the Japanese air defenses; LeMay later claimed that during this period "it was safer to fly a combat mission over Japan than it was to fly a B-29 training mission back in the United States".^[179]

Overall, Japanese fighters shot down 74 B-29s, anti-aircraft guns accounted for a further 54 and 19 were downed by a combination of anti-aircraft guns and fighters. IJAAF and IJN losses during the defense of Japan were 1,450 aircraft in combat and another 2,750 to other causes.^[180]

Treatment of prisoners of war

Most of the Allied airmen who were captured after being shot down over Japan were mistreated. On 8 September 1944, members of the Cabinet of Japan directed that indiscriminate bombing constituted a war crime.^[181] As a result, captured Allied airmen were subject to trial and possible execution.^[182] The frequency of such executions differed between military districts, however. While no airmen were executed in the Tobu district (which included Tokyo), those captured in the Tōkai, Chūbu and Seibu districts were sometimes killed after a brief trial or summarily executed by the Kempeitai ("Military Police Corps").^[183] Mobs of civilians also sometimes killed downed Allied airmen before the Japanese military arrived to take the men into custody.^[184] In addition to these killings, most captured B-29 crewmen were brutally interrogated by the Kempeitai.^[185]

Of the approximately 545 Allied airmen who were captured in the Japanese home islands (excluding the Kuril and Bonin Islands), 29 were killed by civilians, 132 were executed and another 94 died from other causes while in Japanese custody, including 52 who were killed when they were deliberately not evacuated from a prison in Tokyo during the 25/26 May raid on the city.^[186][187] Six survivors of a B-29 shot down on 5 May were subjected to vivisection at the Kyushu Imperial University.^[188] Many of the Japanese personnel responsible for the deaths of Allied airmen were prosecuted in the Yokohama War Crimes Trials following the war. Several of those found guilty were executed and the remainder were imprisoned.^[189]

Atomic bombings and final attacks

Beginning in 1942 the United States, with assistance from Britain and other Allied countries, devoted considerable resources to developing nuclear weapons through the Manhattan Project. In December 1944 the USAAF's 509th Composite Group was formed under the command of Colonel Paul Tibbets to deliver these weapons once they were complete and, after a period of training, it deployed to Tinian during May and June 1945.^[190] On 16 July the "Trinity" test of the first nuclear bomb was successful.^[191] Four days later the 509th Composite Group's modified "Silverplate" B-29s began flying practice raids against Japanese cities, each armed with a single high explosive "pumpkin" bomb; further practice missions were conducted on 24, 26 and 29 July. Japanese fighters did not attempt to intercept these aircraft, and their bombing altitude of 30,000 feet (9,100 m) was beyond the range of most anti-aircraft guns.^[192] Meanwhile, on 24 July President Harry S. Truman approved the use of atomic bombs against Japan, and the next day Spaatz received written orders to this effect. These orders specified that the first attack should be made after 3 August, and named Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki as the targets for the atomic bombs.^[193] On 26 July the United States, Britain and China issued the Potsdam Declaration which demanded Japan's surrender after warning that the country would be devastated if the war continued. The Japanese Government rejected the Allied demands on 28 July.^[194]

Hiroshima was attacked on 6 August. At 8:15 am local time the B-29 Enola Gay, which was piloted by Tibbets, dropped the "Little Boy" atomic bomb over the center of the city. The resulting explosion killed tens of thousands of people and destroyed about 4.7 square miles (12 km²) of buildings.^[195] The six American aircraft involved in this attack returned to the Marianas safely.^[196] Postwar estimates of casualties from the attack on Hiroshima range from 66,000 to 80,000 fatalities and 69,000 to 151,000 injured.^[197] Tens of thousands more subsequently died as a result of radiation and other injuries from the attack; it has been estimated that 140,000 people had died as a result of the atomic bomb by the end of 1945. Estimates of the total number of fatalities range as high as 230,000.^[198][199] Of the survivors of the bombing, 171,000 were rendered homeless.^[200]

Following the attack, a statement from President Truman was broadcast which announced that the United States had used an atomic bomb against Hiroshima and that further air attacks would be conducted on Japan's industrial facilities and transportation network. The statement included a threat that if Japan did not surrender under the terms specified in the Potsdam Declaration it would be subjected to "a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on earth".^[201] Two days later, daylight incendiary raids were made against the cities of Yawata and Fukuyama; these attacks destroyed 21 percent of Yawata's urban area and over 73 percent of Fukuyama.^[124] Japanese aircraft intercepted the force dispatched against Yawata and shot down a B-29 and five of the escorting P-47s for the loss of approximately 12 fighters.^[202]

The second atomic bomb attack was made on 9 August. On this day, the B-29 Bockscar was dispatched to attack Kokura with the "Fat Man" bomb. The city was found to be covered in smoke and haze, however, and as a result, the plane's pilot, Major Charles Sweeney, decided to attack the secondary target of Nagasaki instead. The bomb was dropped at 10:58 am local time, and the resulting 20 kiloton explosion destroyed 1.45 square miles (3.8 km²) of buildings in the Urakami district.^[203][204] Estimates of Japanese casualties range from 23,753 to 45,000 killed and 25,000 to 60,000 wounded.^[197] Official Japanese figures in the late 1990s state the total killed exceeded 100,000.^[205] The effect of the attack on Nagasaki on the city's industrial production was crippling. Steel production was set back by one year, electrical power was severely reduced for two months and arms production was greatly reduced.^[206] All the American aircraft involved in the operation returned safely to Tinian.^[207] The Soviet invasion of Manchuria also began on 9 August, with the Red Army making rapid progress.^[208] On this day B-29s dropped three million leaflets on Japanese cities which claimed that atomic bombs would be used to destroy all the country's military resources unless the Emperor ended the war.^[209]

In response to the atomic bomb attacks and Soviet intervention, the Japanese Government began negotiations with the Allies about the terms of surrender on 10 August.^[210] During this period B-29 attacks on Japan were limited to a raid by the 315th Bombardment Wing against an oil target on the night of 9/10 August and a daytime precision bombing attack on a factory in Tokyo on 10 August. The next day, President Truman ordered a halt to the bombing due to the possibility that it would be seen as a sign that peace negotiations had failed.^[211] On 11 August Spaatz also issued a new targeting directive for any renewed attacks which reduced the emphasis on bombing cities in favor of intensified attacks on transportation infrastructure.^[212] On 13 August, B-29s dropped copies of the Japanese Government's conditional offer to surrender over Japanese cities.^[213] Negotiations appeared to be stalled, and on 14 August Spaatz received orders to resume the bombing campaign. Arnold requested the largest attack possible, and hoped that USASTAF could dispatch 1,000 aircraft against the Tokyo region and other locations in Japan. In the event, 828 B-29s escorted by 186 fighters (for a total of 1,014 aircraft) were dispatched; during the day aircraft conducted precision attacks on targets at Iwakuni, Osaka and Tokoyama and at night the cities of Kumagaya and Isesaki were firebombed.^[214][215] While the Eighth Air Force units at Okinawa had not yet conducted any missions against Japan, General Doolittle decided against contributing aircraft to this operation as he did not want to risk the lives of the men under this command when the war was effectively over.^[216] These were the last attacks conducted against Japan by heavy bombers, as at noon on 15 August the Japanese Emperor Hirohito made a radio broadcast announcing his country's intention to surrender.^[217]

Postwar

Limited air operations continued over Japan in the weeks following the Japanese Government's decision to surrender. On 17 and 18 August, B-32 Dominators flying reconnaissance missions from Okinawa were attacked by IJN fighters near Tokyo.^[219] From 17 August the Twentieth Air Force was made responsible for supplying Allied prisoner of war camps in Japan, Korea and China until the prisoners were evacuated. Supply drops began 10 days later, and continued until 20 September. During this period the B-29s flew almost 1,000 sorties and delivered close to 4,500 tons of supplies.^[220] Eight aircraft crashed during these missions and another was damaged by a Soviet fighter over Korea.^[221] While Spaatz ordered that B-29s and fighters fly continuous show of force patrols of the Tokyo area from 19 August until the formal surrender ceremony took place, these operations were initially frustrated by bad weather and logistics problems. The first patrols were not flown until 30 August, when they were made in conjunction with the landing of General Douglas MacArthur and the US Army's 11th Airborne Division at Atsugi airfield.^[222] A similar operation was conducted the next day, and on 2 September 462 B-29s and many naval aircraft overflew the Allied fleet in Tokyo Bay after the surrender ceremony on board USS Missouri concluded.^[223]

Allied air units participated in the occupation of Japan after the war. Advance parties of the FEAF began to arrive at Atsugi airfield on 30 August, and units of the Fifth Air Force were established across the Japanese home islands during September and October.^[224] Besides transporting occupation troops, the Fifth Air Force conducted armed patrols over Japan and Korea as well as many photo reconnaissance and mapping sorties.^[225] Royal Australian Air Force, British Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force, U.S. Navy and United States Marine Corps air units were also deployed to Japan for occupation duties.^[226][227] There was no Japanese resistance to the Allied occupation, and the number of air units stationed in the country was gradually reduced from late 1945.^[228]

Japan's bomb-damaged cities were rebuilt after the war. War damage and the need to rehouse soldiers and civilians returning from overseas resulted in a shortage of 4.2 million units of housing which, combined with food shortages, led to many civilians being forced to live in harsh conditions.^[229] In September 1945 the Japanese Government offered to provide material for 300,000 small temporary houses to evacuees, but the emphasis of its policies in this year and 1946 was to stop people returning to the damaged cities.^[230] The reconstruction of 115 cities began in 1946, and this work was conducted in line with guidelines developed by the Japanese Government.^[231] The Allied occupation authorities were not involved in the urban rebuilding effort, but permitted this work to go ahead despite criticizing it as being inappropriate given Japan's status as a defeated country. Requisitions of land and buildings for use by the occupation force and a requirement that the Japanese Government prioritize the construction of housing for the Allied troops interfered with reconstruction, however.^[232] In many cities rebuilding was accompanied by a process of land readjustment which sought to improve the urban layout, though the success of both land readjustment and rebuilding programs varied between locations.^[233] Overall, most of the new buildings were of poor quality and it was not until well after the war, that major urban improvement projects were undertaken.^[234]

Assessments

Results

The air attacks on Japan caused hundreds of thousands of casualties, though estimates of the number who were killed and wounded vary considerably. The strategic attacks by the Twentieth Air Force caused most of the casualties and damage. The figures most frequently cited in the literature on the campaign are sourced from the USSBS report The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Services in Japan which estimated that 333,000 Japanese were killed and 473,000 wounded.^[235][236] Another USSBS report, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale, included a much higher estimate of 900,000 killed and 1.3 million injured which was reached by a Japanese research team using a statistical sampling methodology. While this figure is also occasionally cited, the USSBS' investigators regarded the work of their statistical teams as unsatisfactory and the researchers were unable to calculate the error rate of this estimate.^[237] The postwar Japanese Government calculated in 1949 that the number of deaths from air attack in the Home Islands was 323,495.^[238] The destruction of buildings housing government records during air raids contributed to the uncertainty about the number of casualties.^[239] The Twentieth Air Force lost 414 B-29s during attacks on Japan. Over 2,600 American bomber crew members were killed, including POWs who died in captivity, and a further 414 were wounded.^[2]

The following table provides examples of the estimated number of Japanese casualties from air attack:

Source	Estimate of Japanese casualties from Allied air raids
USSBS (June 1947)	The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Services in Japan: 333,000 killed, 473,000 wounded[235]
USSBS (July 1947)	The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale: 900,000 killed, 1.3 million injured[240]
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (1995)	Approximately 500,000 killed[241]
Frank (1999)	About 410,000 killed[242]
Dower (1986)	Approximately 393,367 killed[243]
Tillman (2010)	At least 330,000 killed[244]
Craven and Cate (1953)	About 330,000 killed, 476,000 wounded[135]
Russell (2001)	About 330,000 killed, 476,000 wounded[245]
Japanese Government (1949)	323,495 killed[242]
Hoyt (2000)	300,000 civilians killed and 500,000 wounded[246]
Takai and Sakaida (2001)	241,309 killed, 213,041 injured.[239]

Much of Japan's industrial capacity was destroyed by Allied bombing. Over 600 major industrial facilities were destroyed or badly damaged, contributing to a large decline in production.^[247] Absenteeism caused by the air attacks further reduced industrial output.^[248] It is not possible to determine the exact damage bombing caused to Japan's economy, however, as the general breakdown which occurred from late 1944 was also the result of the Allied naval blockade. Statistics complied by the USSBS show a correlation between the number of B-29 sorties directed at different industries and the amount by which their production declined, but air attacks were not the only reason for these differences.^[249] In addition to the heavy bomber attacks, the operations by Allied aircraft carriers tightened the blockade by disrupting Japanese coastal shipping; the naval aircraft were unable to carry enough bombs to affect seriously Japanese industrial plants, however.^[250] In addition to the results of air attacks, Japan's rice crop of 1945 failed. The resulting shortage of rice caused widespread malnutrition, and mass starvation would have occurred had the war continued.^[251] In financial terms, the Allied air campaign and attacks on merchant ships destroyed between one third and a quarter of Japan's wealth.^[252]

The attacks also caused extensive damage to Japan's urban areas. Approximately 40 percent of the urban area of the 66 cities subjected to area attacks were destroyed.^[253] This included the loss of about 2.5 million housing units which rendered 8.5 million people homeless.^[254] The Allied urban area attacks reduced the morale of the Japanese population, and postwar surveys conducted by the USSBS found that air attacks were the most important factor in convincing the Japanese that the war had been lost. During the final months of the war the raids also contributed to the deterioration of the Japanese social fabric.^[255] To achieve this, the American Twentieth Strategic Air Force, in concert with its Allies, dropped 160,800 tons of bombs on the Japanese home islands. Of this total, 147,000 tons of bombs was dropped by the B-29 bomber force. Around 90 percent of the American tonnage fell in the last five months of the war.^[256]

Allied air raids significantly influenced the Japanese Government's decision to surrender. The USSBS concluded that Japan would have been forced to surrender by 1 November 1945 due to pressure from air attacks and blockade. While the Survey did not state that any single factor caused the surrender, during interrogations most Japanese wartime leaders nominated the prolonged air attacks on the home islands as being the single most important factor which influenced their decision to end the war.^[257] In particular, Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki stated that the combination of the conventional B-29 raids, Potsdam Declaration and atomic bombings gave the Government the opportunity to begin negotiations with the Allies. Emperor Hirohito cited damage from the attacks, inadequate preparations to resist invasion and the Soviet offensive as his justifications for authorizing the surrender.^[258][259]

Morality

There has been debate over the morality of the air campaign against Japan since World War II. During the war the American public approved of the bombing of Germany and Japan, and the few people who criticized the raids were attacked as being unrealistic or even traitors. Some United States government and military personnel believed that the bombing campaign was morally ambiguous, however, but rarely voiced their views publicly.^[260]

The moral concerns over the attacks have been focused on the large number of civilian casualties and property damage they caused. Mark Selden described the summer 1945 peak of the bombing campaign as "still perhaps unrivaled in the magnitude of human slaughter" and stated that the contributing factors to its intensity were a combination of, "technological breakthroughs, American nationalism, and the erosion of moral and political scruples about killing of civilians, perhaps intensified by the racism that crystallized in the Pacific theater."^[261] In response to the claim that anti-Japanese sentiment was a factor, Richard B. Frank argues that this difference was attributable to the evolution in views towards bombing over the course of the war, as well as the limited intelligence on structure of the Japanese economy available to the Allies and the much greater vulnerability of Japanese cities to incendiary bombs.^[262] Barrett Tillman has also written that due to the limitations of technology at the time, and the high winds over Japan, most 'precision' bombing of Japanese facilities also caused widespread damage to surrounding areas, and that the firebombing attacks against Japanese cities were successful in destroying the country's aircraft industry.^[263] Edwin P. Hoyt wrote in 1987 that Japanese people commonly regard the Allied bombing of civilians as being the worst atrocity of the war.^[264]

The atomic bomb attacks have been the subject of long-running controversy. Shortly after the attacks an opinion poll found that about 85 percent of Americans supported the use of atomic weapons, and the wartime generation believed that they had saved millions of lives. Criticisms over the decision to use the bombs have increased over time, however. Arguments made against the attacks include that Japan would have eventually surrendered and that the attacks were made to either intimidate the Soviet Union or justify the Manhattan Project. By 1994, an opinion poll found that 55 percent of Americans supported the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.^[265] When registering the only dissenting opinion of the judges involved in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1947, Justice Radhabinod Pal argued that Japan's leadership had not conspired to commit atrocities and stated that the decision to conduct the atomic bomb attacks was the clearest example of a direct order to conduct "indiscriminate murder" during the Pacific War.^[266] Since then, Japanese academics, such as Yuki Tanaka and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, have argued that use of the bombs was immoral and constituted a war crime.^[267] In contrast, President Truman and, more recently, historians such as Paul Fussell have argued that the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified as they induced the Japanese surrender.^[268]

On two occasions Japanese citizens have sued the Japanese Government for damages from the bombings, arguing that the government is culpable for having waged a "reckless war" that provoked the bombings and for requiring civilians to remain in the targeted areas. In December 2009 the Tokyo District Court dismissed one of the suits, with the judgment stating that as all Japanese citizens suffered during the war it is impossible to identify individuals who deserve redress. The court also found that any compensation should be allocated through the legislative, not judicial, process. In December 2011, the Osaka District Court handed down a similar ruling, adding that the government did not violate its constitution in its treatment of bombing victims. The court stated that it had not found "unreasonable disparity" in how the government treated civilians, soldiers, and atomic bomb survivors, and that the government had showed "no gross deviation from its discretionary right in not legislating for redress measures".^[269]

Notes

References

Further reading

External links

• Japanairraids.org

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